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ABSTRACT
Credit risk modeling has permeated our everyday life. Most banks
and financial companies use this technique to model their clients’
trustworthiness.While machine learning is increasingly used in this
field, the resulting large-scale collection of user private information
has reinvigorated the privacy debate, considering dozens of data
breach incidents every year caused by unauthorized hackers, and
(potentially even more) information misuse/abuse by authorized
parties. To address those critical concerns, this paper proposes
a framework of privacy-preserving credit risk modeling based on
adversarial learning (PCAL). PCAL aims to mask the private infor-
mation inside the original dataset, while maintaining the important
utility information for the target prediction task performance, by
(iteratively) weighing between a privacy-risk loss and a utility-
oriented loss. PCAL is compared against off-the-shelf options in
terms of both utility and privacy protection. Results indicate that
PCAL can learn an effective, privacy-free representation from user
data, providing a solid foundation towards privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning for credit risk analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
Credit scores – numbers indicating the likelihood that a person will
pay off his debts, such as FICO Score or Vantage Score, has now
been the standard tool to evaluate millions of applicants’ financial
trustworthiness. Such a prevalence of credit scores has reinvigo-
rated the privacy debate, since most of them require applicants to
upload their personal information, including highly private and sen-
sitive attribute such as annual income. Traditional cryptographic
solutions secure communication against unauthorized access from
hackers. However, they are not applicable to preventing autho-
rized agents (such as the bank analysts) from the unauthorized
abuse of information, that causes privacy breach concerns. The
popular concept of differential privacy [1] has been introduced to
prevent an adversary from gaining additional knowledge by inclu-
sion/exclusion of a subject, but not from gaining knowledge from
released data itself. In other words, an adversary can still accurately
infer sensitive attributes from any sanitized sample available, which
does not violate any (proven) property of differential privacy.
This paper seeks to answer the question proposed by [6]: how
to preserve your privacy while still allowing the banks to make the
necessary predictions and analyses? At first glance, this question
seems unsolvable: some of the privacy information itself is essential
for the bank to make a decision or to give you a credit score, like an-
nual income or account balance. We proposed a Privacy-preserving
Credit risk modeling system based on Adversarial Learning(PCAL)
to tackle this challenge. PCAL requires a learned masking model
deployed in the clients’ end, which tries to anonymize the original
data, and then pass its output – anonymized data – to the bank to
let them analyze risk. The anonymization model directly optimizes
the trade-off between analysis performance and associated privacy
budget. The latter is quantified by monitoring the success rate of a
(dynamic) privacy-hacking model. Strategies and evaluation pro-
tocols are also defined. Two experiments on real-life loan datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness of PCAL.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Credit Risk Modeling
Plenty of researches have already applied machine learning tech-
niques on credit risk modeling. [8] applied Classification And Re-
gression Tree (CART) to construct forecasting models of consumer
credit risk by combining customer transactions and credit bureau
data. Deep belief networks were also leveraged to achieve results
better than traditional credit scoring models such as logistic regres-
sion, multi-layer perceptron, and support vector machine [10].
Existing models aim to maximize predictive performance using
all available information. However, not all data is essential for
the desired utility, meanwhile, there is certainly privacy leak risk
associated with (part of) the data. PCAL aims to strike a more
balanced trade-off between the utility and the privacy, by learning
to extract a task-related yet privacy-free representation from data.
2.2 Privacy Preserving in Credit Modeling
Privacy-preserving credit risk modeling is about protecting users’
sensitive information and bridging the credibility gap between
loan applicants and loan providers. [4] emphasizes the urgent need
for privacy protection in risk modeling and calls for the laws and
regulations to preserve users’ data. [6] requires the loan providers to
inform consent for sharingwhen collecting users’ data and to collect
user-permitted data only. However, many of the privacy-related
data are essential to perform credit risk modeling. Also, this method
requires perceived honesty and fairness from the loan provider, and
can not prevent the potential privacy leak from happening. To the
best of our knowledge, no previous project used any technically
preserve privacy in credit risk modeling on data or model level, and
we are the first that attempts to use a learning-based method to
address this problem.
2.3 Privacy Protection via Adversarial Learning
Recently, a few learning-based methods have come into play to
ensure better privacy protection. In [11], the authors proposed a
game-theoretic framework between an obfuscator and an attacker,
to hide visual secrets in the camera feed without significantly af-
fecting the functionality of the target application. However, their
method can only be applied to known single-attribute human-made
privacy (a purposely attached QR code on a picture in their case)
and cannot protect multiple privacy attributes and unknown in-
ferred privacy information. [12–14] proposed a privacy-preserving
learning framework for action recognition that prevents smart cam-
eras at home from privacy invasion while allowing them to detect
actions. PCAL is in many ways inspired by [12–14] while adapting
many of their modules for the specific task of credit risk analysis.
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed framework: privacy-preserving credit risk modeling based on adversarial learning (PCAL).
3 TECHNICAL APPROACH
3.1 Problem Definition
Given training data X𝑡 (users’ financial data), our goal is to learn a
representation that maintains a comparable target utility T (risk
prediction performance) while preserving privacy by suppressing
a privacy budget P (e.g., measuring how easily the sensitive at-
tributes can be inferred from the learned features). Our goal can be
mathematically expressed as below (𝜆 is a coefficient):
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑇 ,𝑓𝐴𝐿𝑇 (𝑓𝑇 (𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )), 𝑌𝑇 ) + 𝜆Φ(𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )) (1)
Here, the 𝑓𝐴 is the anonymizationmodel that learns a representation
𝑓𝐴 (X𝑡 ) from the original data X𝑡 . The task model 𝑓𝑇 is to perform
the target task T and predict label 𝑌𝑇 (originally defined on X𝑡 ).
A standard loss function 𝐿𝑇 is used to evaluate the performance
of the target task on the learned representation: the lower 𝐿𝑇 , the
better representation that can be used for risk analysis. A privacy
leak metric Φ is used to evaluate the privacy budget P: the larger
Φ, the higher privacy leak.
The objective hereby is to find a data anonymization model 𝑓𝐴
in a "Minimax Filter" [5] manner, such that
(1) the performance of 𝑓𝑇 is minimally affected,
i.e.,𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑇 ,𝑓𝐴𝐿𝑇 (𝑓𝑇 (𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )), 𝑌𝑇 ) ≈𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑇 𝐿𝑇 (𝑓𝑇 (𝑋𝑡 ), 𝑋𝑡 );
(2) the privacy leak metric Φ is minimized,
i.e. Φ(𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )) ≪ Φ(𝑋𝑡 ).
3.2 Defining the Proxy for Privacy Cost
The definition of privacy leak metric Φ is not simple. The Φ is a
function to evaluate how much privacy leak exists in the learned
representation 𝑓𝐴 (X𝑡 ). Following [14], we use an inference-based
proxy loss to empirically approximate Φ, defined as below:
Φ(𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 ) = −𝐿𝑃 (𝑓𝑃 (𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )), 𝑌𝑃 ) (2)
Here𝑌𝑃 is the privacy label in original dataX𝑡 . 𝑓𝑃 is a privacy hacker
model which tries to infer 𝑌𝑃 from 𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 ). 𝐿𝑃 is a loss function,
which indicates the performance of privacy-hacking. Since the
more easily a hack could happen, the more sensitive information
the representation might contain, we reverse the sign to make sure
that Φ increases as 𝐿𝑃 decreases.
This definition of Φ is based on the definition of one known 𝑓𝑃 ,
but in reality, the hacker model is never pre-known, so it is not
sufficient to suppress the success rate of only one hacker model.
We therefore enhance our proxy, by considering a set of𝑀 dif-
ferent privacy hacker models H𝑡 = {𝑓 𝑖𝑃 | 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑀}, used in
training:
Φ(𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 ) = −𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓𝑃 ∈H𝑡 𝐿𝑃 (𝑓𝑃 (𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑡 )), 𝑌𝑃 ) (3)
Our rationale lies in that the proper privacy protection should
suppress every hacker model in H𝑡 , approximating the ideal re-
quirement that it should withstand every possible hacker. For a
solved 𝑓𝐴 , the utility should be well sustained on 𝑓𝐴 (X𝑡 ) using 𝑓𝑇 ,
while no hacker (within or outside H𝑡 ) can intrude into the pro-
tected privacy attributes. Implementation-wise, we ensemble the
𝑀 diverse models with winner-take-all, to formH𝑡 in training.
3.3 Overall Framework
The PCAL (illustrated in Fig 1) uses the original data X𝑡 as input.
The main module to be learned, 𝑓𝐴 , is used to anonymize the data
while still preserving enough information for the predictive task
utility. The anonymized representation is then passed as input to a
target utility task model 𝑓𝑇 and a privacy hacker model 𝑓𝑃 at the
same time. The entire model is trained using the function defined in
(1), in an adversarial learning fashion. 𝑓𝐴 expects to find an optimal
task-aware yet privacy-removing transformation.
During adversarial training, we find a restarting technique use-
ful to avoid trapping in bad local minima: when Φ(𝑓𝐴 (X𝑡 ) is ob-
served to not decrease anymore, we reset the weights in 𝑓𝑃 to
random, while keeping other modules with their current weights
unchanged, and continue training from there. The performance can
often keep improving afterward.
Our last question to address is how to evaluate. We need to en-
sure our anonymized data is robustly reliable against any unseen
privacy hackers. We adopt the empirical evaluation protocol in
[14]: given evaluation data X𝑒 , we first re-sample a different set
of 𝑁 models, H𝑒 = {𝑓 𝑖𝑃 | 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁 } that are disjoint with H𝑡 ;
we then train each of them to predict the privacy attributes from
the anonymized representations and test their generalization. The
best prediction performance empirically indicates the “worst case
defense performance" of the learned representation, and will be
used to evaluate the privacy protection effectiveness. Specifically,
Φ(𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑒 ) =𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓𝑃 ∈H𝑒𝐿𝑃 (𝑓𝑃 (𝑓𝐴 (𝑋𝑒 )), 𝑌𝑃 ),whereH𝑒 ∩H𝑡 = ∅.
(4)
2
WP SP PCAL UP
Loan Decision Accuracy 77.14 57.40 95.29 97.39
Privacy
Attacking
Result
(𝑅2)
SVR 0.68 0.28 0.29 1
RFR 0.62 0.38 0.29 1
ElasticNet 0.58 0.27 0.27 1
Wide Net 0.40 0.18 0.28 1
Narrow Net 0.37 0.23 0.07 1
Shallow Net 0.46 0.19 0.18 1
Deep Net 0.49 0.20 0.39 1
Standard Net 0.38 0.31 0.07 1
Table 1: Loan Decision and Privacy Attacking Performance on BLS
WP SP PCAL UP
Loan Decision Accuracy 77.14 57.40 95.29 97.39
Privacy
Attacking
Result
(𝑅2)
SVR 0.48 0.17 0.19 1
RFR 0.38 0.16 0.17 1
ElasticNet 0.29 0.13 0.18 1
Wide Net 0.17 0.08 0.06 1
Narrow Net 0.06 0.06 0.05 1
Shallow Net 0.29 0.09 0.09 1
Deep Net 0.19 0.13 0.11 1
Standard Net 0.17 0.12 0.10 1
Table 2: Loan Decision and Privacy Attacking Performance on LCL
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Datasets and Implementation Details
We evaluate PCAL on two different datasets. The BLS dataset[2]
with 50k records from loan borrowers, consists of privacy-sensitive
information (i.e. name, income, and account balance) and the risk
evaluation (decision to the loan application) by professional bankers.
The Lending Club Loan dataset[7] contains an 890k record of loan
issued between 2007-2015.
Here we define the target utility task T to be loan decision and
the privacy budget task P to be the inferring of one or multiple
sensitive attributes (annual income, total balance). The goal here is
to learn the masked representation that risk-related information is
kept while privacy-relevant attributes are removed. The results is
shown in table 1 & 2.
We utilized a three-layer fully-connected neural network for each
of the choices of anonymization model 𝑓𝐴 , task model 𝑓𝑇 , and pri-
vacy model 𝑓𝑃 . In the ensemble setting, we use five fully-connected
neural networks with different width and depth to ensemble 𝑓𝑃 ,
trained with MSE losses 𝐿𝑇 and 𝐿𝑃 .
4.2 Evaluation and Baselines
The privacy-preserving performance is evaluated by regressing
the privacy-sensitive attribute values. We use r-squared error to
show privacy-hacking result. To cover as much as possible privacy-
hacking models in R, we manually selected eight unseen mod-
els, including Support Vector Regression[3] (SVR), Random Forest
Regression[9] (RFR), ElasticNet Regression[15] and five neural net-
works with different widths and depths (Wide Net, Narrow Net,
Shallow Net, Deep Net, and Standard Net). We tested the masked
representations with all eight hackers and these models come to a
unanimous conclusion. The results is shown in table 1 & 2.
Due to the absence of peer methods, we design the following
baselines to comparewith PCAL, to demonstrate the superior utility-
privacy trade-off it can achieve:
(i) Weak Protection (WP): removing only the explicit privacy
attributes from the original data.
(ii) Strong protection (SP): removing all the attributes, whose
correlations with the privacy part are above a threshold (0.4),
and only use those weakly related data (e.g. loan purpose,
number of open accounts).
(iii) Unprotected (UP): Directly using the unprotected raw data.
4.3 Results and Analysis
Table 1 & 2 report the performance obtained by 8 models on those
methods. We summarize observations as below:
(1) PCAL has clear advantages over the naive WP and SP in
the task accuracy. This makes sense since simply removing
privacy attributes (either in a weak or a strong sense) causes
inevitable damage to the target task performance.
(2) PCAL maintains a competitive task utility performance w.r.t.
UP, while being much superior in protecting privacy (almost
as well as SP), showing the most ideal trade-off.
5 CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt to design
an adversarial learning framework for preserving privacy in credit
risk analysis. We hope PCAL can help in part address the privacy
leak concern for financial company clients.
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